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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner, convicted of first degree murder sentenced to death while represented by a
lawyer without co-counsel, who had only a few years earlier graduated law school, and who had
no experience whatsoever in capital litigation, filed his third and fourth postconviction petitions
in district court in 2002. In his third postconviction petition, he sought the benefit of Ring v.

Arizona, 536 US. 584. The distsict court denied relief in that case, and it is now pending before
the court. The instant case is an appeal from the district court's denial of his fourth
postconviction petition in which he sought relief based on a host of ineffective assistance of
counsel claims and prosecutorial misconduct claims.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1.

Whether Idaho Code Section 19-2719 properly governs this case.

2.

Assuming arguendo that Section 19-2719 does properly govern this case, whether that
statute's time bars apply or, alternatively, whether they must be struck as violating the
state and/or federal constitutions.

3.

Whether Idaho courts have jurisdiction to consider claims brought pursuant to the Idaho
constitutional right to habeas corpus.

4.

Whether the Idaho courts should reach the merits of Petitioner's claims.

ARGUMENT

I.

IDAHO CODE SECTION 19-2719 DOES NOT GOVERN THESE
POSTCONVICTION PROCEEDINGS.
Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 19-2719, the court below summarily dismissed Mr.

Stuart's petition seeking postconviction relief. Yet Section 19-2719 violates the Idaho
Constitution, other Idaho law, and the federal constitution. Thus, it cannot govern these
proceedings.

A.

Idaho Code Section 19-2719 Violates The Idaho Constitution's Prohibition
Against Ex Post Facto Laws.

Petitioner seeks relief from a 1982 death sentence. Idaho Code Section 19-2719 did not
yet exist. That statute was first enacted in 1984. The state and federal constitutions each prohibit
expost facro laws. U.S.Const. art. I, $10, cl. 1. Idaho Const. art. I, $16. Applying a law enacted
after the commission of the crime to "make more burdensome the punishment" violates the ex
post facto clause. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37,52 (1990). For example, in Garner v.
Jones, 529 U.S. 244 (2000), the United States Supreme Court held that increasing the interval
between parole reconsiderations may violate the expostfacto clause. Whether it does depends,
the Court held, on whether the change "creates a significant risk" of making the punishment
more burdensome -there, by prolonging the respondent's incarceration.
The court below rejected this argument, further explicated below, apparently on the
ground that Section 19-2719(S)(c)does not increase the punishment for criminal acts because:
the argument seems to go, Petitioner's sentence is not increased.

While Section 19-2719's provisions may appear at first glance to implicate none of the
categories of laws which violate the expostfacto prohibition, neither did the statute struck down
in Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1980). There, the challenged statute removed "gain time for
good conduct" granted to prison inmates. Id at 25. The state argued that the revised statute
could not run afoul of the expost facto clause because it was "'no part of the original sentence
and thus no part of the punishment annexed to the crime at the time petitioner was sentenced."'

Id. at 3 1 (quoting State's brief). The Court rejected this argument, noting, first, that "we need not
determine whether the prospect of the gain time was in some technical sense part of the sentence
to conclude that it in fact is one determinant of petitioner's prison term-and that his effective
sentence is altered once this determinant is changed" and, second, that "we have held that a
statue may be retrospective even if it alters punitive conditions outside the sentence." Thus, a
statute may sufficiently affect a sentence so as to violate the expost facto prohibition even
though it constitutes no part of the imposed sentence. As the Supreme Court noted in California

Department of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499 (1995), "We have previously declined to
articulate a single 'formula' for identifying those legislative changes that have a sufficient effect
on substantive crimes or punishments to fall within the constitutional prohibition, and we have
no occasion to do so here." Id. at 509 (citation omitted). Instead, the test for determining
whether a change in law violates the expost facto prohibition is whether the change "created 'a
sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes.'

[Morales,514 U.S.] at 509." Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244 (2000).
The Garner test, however, does more than clarify whether a law which was no part of the
imposed sentence violates the expost facto prohibition. It also serves to distinguish those

procedural changes which constitute expostfacto violations and those which do not. The court
below appears to reject Mr. Stuart's claim on the ground that Section 19-2719 is procedural in
nature. Applying the Garner test demonstrates that the procedural changes enacted by Section
19-2719 run afoul of the expostfacto clause.
Applying Sections 19-2719(3) & (5) to Mr. Stuart's case would unquestionably create a
significant risk of making his sentence more burdensome than if the Uniform Post-Conviction
Procedure Act ("UPUPA") were applied. For while those statutory sections contemplate barring
claims not raised within 42 days of the filing of the judgment regardless of petitioner's mental
state in relation to those claims and their waiver, under the UPUPA a petitioner's delay in
asserting claims may be deemed a waiver only if he knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently
waived the claims. I.C. 519-4808. As this Court has held:

In capital cases, a successive petition is allowed only where the
petitioner can demonstrate that the issues raised were not known or
could not reasonably have been known within the 42-day time
frame. This is in contrast with the UPUPA, which requires waiver
to be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. LC. 3 19-4908.
McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695,701,992 P.2d 144, 150 (Idaho1999). Because the Section 194908 hurdle is significantly lower for petitioners than the Section 19-2719 hurdle, it is more
likely that the Court would reach the merits of Mr. Stuart's claims if he were required to clear the
former and not the latter. This was, of course, the Idaho legislature's expressed purpose in
enacting Section 19-2719, as is clear form the contrast between the statute and Section 19-4908,
McKinney, as well as the legislature's explicitly described purpose. LC. 519-2719 ("The
following special procedures shall be interpreted to accomplish the purpose of eliminating
unnecessary delay in carrying out a valid death sentence.") (italics added). Further, Mr. Stuart's

claims are remarkably strong. The relative strength of his claims shows that Mr. Stuart would
likely prevail on their merits and thus obtain a reduced sentence and/or vacation of his
conviction. Thus, not only does the statutory change and purpose in enacting Section 19-2719
allow an inference that the change created "a sufficient high risk of increasing the measure of
punishment attached to the covered crimes" such that it violates the expost facto clause, the facts
of the instant case compel it. Garner, 529 U.S. at 250. Because death is a more burdensome
penalty than life, Ford v. Wainwright,477 U.S. 399,411 (1986) (plurality opinion) ("execution is
the most irremediable and unfathomable of penalties; . . .death is different."), applying Section
19-2719 to block a merits review of Mr. Stuart's ineffective assistance of counsel claims
constitutes an expost fucto violation.

B.

Section 19-2719 Violates Idaho's Prohibition Against The Retroactive
Application Of New Statutes.

Mr. Stuart's contends that LC. $19-2719(3) is inapplicable because when enacted in its
current version in 2001, it did not include any express language that it is to be retroactively
applied. LC. 573-101. The court below ruled that because when I.C. $19-2719 was enacted in
1984, it included in the session law an express statement that it was to be retroactively applied,
and that statement covers all subsequent versions as well. Yet this Court has held that "an
amendment to an existing statute will not, absent an express legislative statement to the contrary,
be held to be retroactive in application." Nebeker v. Piper Aircraft Corporation, 113 Idaho 609,
614,747 P.2d 18,23 (Idaho 1987) (citations omitted). The 1984 version's declaration of
retroactive affect has no application here because it was not in effect at the time petitioner filed
the instant postconviction petition. Rather, the statute in effect at the time the petition was filed

governs.
This Court's holding that Section 19-2719(3) "creates, defines, and regulates a primary
right" and is, therefore, substantive in nature, compels the same conclusion. State v. Beam, 121
Idaho 862,828 P.2d 891,893 (Idaho1992). For as the Court has long held,
[I]t also is the rule in Idaho that retroactive legislation is only that
which affects vested or already existing rights. Remedial or
procedural statutes which do not create, enlarge, diminish or
destroy contractual or vested rights are generally held to operate
retrospectively.
City of Garden City v. City of Boise, 104 Idaho 512,515,660 P.2d 1355,1358 (Idaho1983)
(citations omitted). Applying Idaho Code Section 19-2719(3) to this case would, therefore,
constitute a retroactive application in violation of Idaho code Section73-101.

11.

IDAHO CODE 919-2719(5)'~UNTIMELY CLAIMS BAR HAS NO
APPLICATION HERE.

The court below rejected Mr. Stuart's claim that Section 19-2719's current prohibition
against claims which were known or reasonably should have been known but were not raised in a
timely filed initial postconviction petition has no application to his case. But the amended
provision on which the Court relies, Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5), cannot be retroactively
applied to the instant case. As well, Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5) violates the Idaho
Constitution's separation of powers mandate, the Idaho and United States Constitutions'
prohibition against expost facto laws, and Mr. Stuart's rights to due process and equal protection
as guaranteed by the United States and Idaho constitutions.

A.

Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)'s Bar Against Claims Already Known Or
Which Should Reasonably Have Been Known Cannot Be Retroactively
Applied Here.

It is long settled "that an amendment to an existing statute will not, absent an express
legislative statement to the contrary, be held to be retroactive in application. Johnson v.

Stoddard, 96 Idaho 230, 526 P.2d 835 (1974)[.lV Nebeker v. Piper Aircraft Corporation, 113
Idaho 609,614,747 P.2d 18,23 (Idaho 1987)(citations omitted) (emphasis added). See Idaho
Code Section 73-101 ("No part of these compiled laws is retroactive, unless expressly so
declared.") The lower court's rejection of this claim was based on the fact that when Section 192719 was enacted in 1984, the legislature included in the session law language making it
retroactive. Mr. Stuart does not claim otherwise. Rather, he contends that because the legislature
did not include similar express retroactivity language when amending subsection (a) into Section
19-2719(5), Idaho Code Section 73-101 precludes that subsection's retroactive application to the
instant case.
Though the instant petition was filed after Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5) was amended
to include subsection (a), applying that statutory provision in this case would constitute a
retroactive application. Paradis v. State, 128 Idaho 223, 912 P.2d 110 (Idaho 1996), illustrates
why. There, the lower court applied a statute enacted after the trial and direct appeal were
concluded. The Supreme Court held that the statute's application was prospective, not
retroactive, because (1) the statute changed postconviction procedures and did not materially
affect any substantive rights of the appellant and (2) "the statutory limitations period [for filing
the postconviction petition] had not yet run." Id. at 227, 114.
The statutory provision at issue in this case stands in dramatic contrast to the one at issue

in Paradis. In particular, Paradis merely prescribed a procedural requirement available to every
postconviction petitioner-that the petition be filed within a statutorily specified time. Far from
prescribing a procedure available to all seeking relief, Idaho Code Section 5 19-2719(5)(c)
purports to raise an absolute bar to relief on any claim based on the retroactive application of a
new rule of law. The distinction is critical. The procedural requirement at issue in Paradis
affected no substantive rights because all postconviction petitioners could comply with it. By
contrast, Section 19-2719(5)(c) does not create mere procedural requirements. Rather, it
precludes an entire class of substantive claims, leaving postconviction petitioners with no
mechanism by which to assert those claims. Put another way, Section 19-2719(5) does not
merely "affect" this class of substantive rights, it purports to destroy them. For this same reason,
the second ground for the Paradis court's holding has no application here. Consequently,
applying Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)(c) to Mr. Stuart would constitute a retroactive
appIication.
Federal courts have noted that this same question may arise with regard to the
Antiterrorism And Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). While the United States
Supreme Court has held that, as a general rule, AEDPA applies to petitions filed after the act's
enactment, it has also noted that specific AEDPA provisions may not be applied if doing so
would have a retroactive effect. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320,327-28 (1997). As the Fourth
Circuit concluded:
We agree with petitioner and those courts that having had cause to consider the
question in full, have concluded that the Supreme court did not hold in Lindh that
courts are necessarily to apply the new provisions of chapter 153 to all habeas
petitions filed after April 24, 1996 [i.e.- AEDPA's enactment date]. More
particularly, we hold that Lindh did not foreclose-and indeed contemplated-

continuing resort to Landgraf [i.e.-retroactivity of statutes] analysis in order to
ensure that application of chapter 153's new provisions is not impermissibly
retroactive in such cases.

Mueller v. Angelone, 181 F.3d 557,567 (4IhCir. 1999)(citingto In re Hansard, 123 F.3d 922,
933 n.22 (6thCir. 1997), and citing to in re Minarik, 166 F.3d 591 (3rdCir. 1999), and Brown v.

Angelone, 150 F.3d 370 (4"' Cir. 1998)). See Scott v. Boos, 215 F.3d 940, 949 (91hCir.
2000)(federal prohibition against retroactive application of statute absent clear Congressional
statement of intent looks to "parties' actions, not the date of filing").
Though Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)(a) expressly purports to absolutely bar successive
postconviction petitioners' claims unless they were not known or could not reasonably have
been known within the prescribed time for filing the initial postconviction petition, it contains no
express legislative statement that it should itself be retroactively applied. It cannot, then, be
applied to the case at bar.

B.

Idaho Code Section 19-2719 Invades the Judiciary's Province, In Violation
Of The Idaho Constitution's Separation Of Powers Requirement.

The court below ruled that Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5) bars Mr. Stuart's claims
because he did not raise them in his initial postconviction proceedings. C.R. at 652-57.

(Memorandum Opinion at 16-21). That statute provides that if a petitioner "fails to apply for
relief.

. . within the time limits specified, . . . [tlhe courts of Idaho shall have no power to

consider any such claims for relief[.]" I.C. $19-2719(5). This violates the Idaho Constitution's
separation of powers requirement by limiting the constitutionally defined original jurisdiction of
the district court.
The Idaho Constitution, Article V, Section 20, confers original jurisdiction on the district

court to hear all cases. Idaho Constitution, Article 11, Section 1, mandates that the powers of the
three governmental branches remain separate, and, more particularly, Article V, Section 13,
specifically prohibits legislative restriction of judicial jurisdiction:
The legislature shall have no power to deprive the judicial
department of any power or jurisdiction which rightly pertains to it
as a coordinate department of the government; but the legislature
shall provide a proper system of appeals, and regulate by law,
when necessary, the methods of proceeding in the exercise of their
powers of all the courts below the Supreme Court, so far as the
same may be done without conflict with the Constitution[.]

Id. (italics added). Of course, as the Supreme Court has long held, a Section 19-2719 petition "is
a proceeding entirely new and independent from the criminal action which led to the conviction."

Paradis v. State, 110 Idaho 534,636, 716 P.2d 1306, 1308 (Idah01986). Thus, Article V, $13'~
reservation of power to the legislature has no application to Section 19-2719 proceedings since
they are not appeals.
The sole case relied on by the court below, Kirkland v. Blaine County Medical Center,
134 Idaho 464,4 P.3d 1115 (Idaho 2000), is inapposite. Kirkland cannot account for the
constitutional guarantee that the "writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless in case of
rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires it, and then only in such manner as shall be
prescribed by law." Idaho Const. art. 1, $5. In Kirkland, the Court nowhere addressed the
interplay between the legislature's power to limit remedies available to plaintiffs and any
constitutional rights vested in plaintiffs. By stark contrast, Petitioner is constitutionally
guaranteed the right to seek a writ of habeas corpus and Idaho courts hold that this remedy may
now be sought only through the vehicle of a postconviction petition. This means that the
legislature's prerogative to limit remedies in the postconviction context is not without constraint.

Rather, the limits may not suspend the writ. The fact that district courts did reach the merits of
habeas claims filed outside the Section 19-2719 time restrictions, demonstrates that the statute
suspends the writ in violation of the constitutional guarantee. Mahafey v. State, 87 Idaho 228,
229-30,392 P.2d 279 (Idaho1964) (reversing district court dismissal of successive habeas
petition brought ten years after conviction). In short, while the legislature's express streamlining
purpose in enacting Section 19-2719 may have been permissible, its chosen means violated the
separation of powers constitutional requirement.
It is Section 19-2719(5)'s removing district court jurisdiction to even consider
postconviction petitions filed outside the legislatively mandated limitations period which violates
the Idaho Constitution's separation of power mandate. Boise City v. Better Homes, Inc., 72 Idaho
441,444-45,243 P.2d 303,304 (Idalio1952) ("[tlhe original jurisdiction conferred upon the
district court by the constitution, Art. 5, $20, cannot be diminished by the legislature. Const.Art.
5, $13[.]"); Clemons v. Kinsley, 72 Idaho 251,256-57,239 P.2d 266,269 (Idahol951) ( "[tlhe
broad jurisdiction [created by Art.5, $131 is not subject to diminution by legislative act."). In
short, the Idaho Supreme Court has consistently and long held that the legislature may not
directly or otherwise restrict the district court's jurisdiction. Consequently, the Court should
remand this case for fkrther proceedings.

C.

Idaho Code Section 19-2519 Violates Petitioner's Rights To Due Process And
Equal Protection Guaranteed Under The United States And Idaho
Constitutions.

If Mr. Stuart did not stand under sentence of death, Idaho Code $19-2719(5) limitations

provisions would not apply.' "LC. 519-2719 does not eliminate the applicability of the UPUPA
to capital cases, but it supersedes the UPUPA to the extent that their provisions conflict."
McGivney v. State, 133 Idaho 695,700,992 P.2d 144, 149 (Idaho 1999). Because of this
difference, I.C. 5 19-2719 violates Mr. Stuart's due process and equal protection rights.
Precluding Mr. Stuart's claims on the basis of Section 19-2719's limitations provisions violates
Mr. Stuart's rights to equal protection and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, and Article 1, Sections 2 and 13 of the Idaho Constitution, in that
there is no rational basis, for the disparate treatment of non-capital prisoners who do not need to
demonstrate the "heightened burden" for postconviction relief which capital petitioners must
meet, e.g., Paz v. State, 123 Idaho 758,760,852 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Idaho 1993), or meet the
limitations imposed by LC. S; 19-2719(5), see, e.g., Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641,648-49,s P.3d
636,643-44 (Idaho 2000); Pizzuto v. State, 134 Idaho 793,796-97, 10 P.3d 742,745-46 (Idaho
1995). Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,63 1-36 (1995); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, 473 U.S. 432,446-51 (1985); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55,61-63 (1982); U.S.D.A. v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,535 (1973); Sterling H Nelson & Sons, Inc. v. Bender, 95 Idaho 813,
815-16,520 P.2d 860,861-62 (Idaho 1974).
Idaho's disparate treatment of capital as compared to non-capital postconviction
petitioners fails under a rational basis analysis. The state's interest in expeditious handling of
'Under the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act ("UPCPA"), "post-conviction relief
is not barred where new evidence is discovered, or where later case law suggests a conviction is
unlawfu" Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 766 n. 12, 760 P.2d, 1 174, I 182 n. 12 (Idaho 1988)
(citing LC.$ 19-4901) (emphasis added). Also, under the UPCPA, I.C. S; 19-4908, a claim can
only be waived ifthe waiver is knowing, voluntary and intelligent. McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho
695,700-01,922 P.2d 144, 149-50 (Idaho 1999). As noted in the text, to the extent that Idaho
Code Section 19-2719 conflicts with the UPUPA, the Section 19-2719 provision governs.

capital cases, the purpose of the offending limitations provision, is not a sufficiently compelling
interest to justify the violation of petitioner's fundamental right to trial by jury.
Additionally, to preclude Mr. Stuart's claims would violate his state and federal
constitutional rights to equal protection inasmuch it would deny him the ability to obtain relief
for the violation of his constitutional rights solely because his judgment is final. See, e.g.,James

Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529,540 (1991) ("there remains even now the
disparate treatment of those cases that come to the Court directly and those that come here in
collateral proceedings").
Finally, LC. § 19-2719(5) is unconstitutionally vague. First, the statute imposes an
internally inconsistent standard of "known" or "should reasonably have known," in subsection
(5) versus a standard of reasonably "could" have been known in subsection (5)(a). I.C. $192515(5)(a). There is little question that "should" have known imposes a less stringent standard
on a petitioner than "could have known." The internally inconsistent standards make application
of the statute unconstitutionally vague. See, e.g., Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999)(statute
"may be impermissibly vague because it fails to establish standards for the police and public that
are sufficient to guard against the arbitrary deprivation of liberty interests. Kolender v. Lawson,
461 U.S. 352,358,103 S.Ct. 1855,75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983)").
It is impossible to glean from the statute or case law regarding 19-2719 waiver standard
exactly what "should reasonably have known" requires. Within the concept of "reasonably
should have known" is a requirement of at least minimal understanding, and familiarity with
claims subject to bar.
Even under an objective standard, the requirement of "reasonableness" put the question of

default beyond a strict liability mandate that the State seeks to have applied and thus subject to
hearing, argument, and appellate review. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not the
types of claim that are familiar to the average lay person -they are defined and identified only if
the party observing the performance (or lack thereof) has legal knowledge in the area under
question.
111.

IDAHO COURTS HAVE JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER CLAIMS BROUGHT
BY MR. STUART PURSUANT TO HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
HABEAS CORPUS.

Mr. Stuart styled his August 2,2002, petition in the instant matter as "Petition For PostConviction Relief And/or Writ Of Habeas Corpus." Though the court below did not address it,
Respondent argued that the court was without jurisdiction to consider Mr. Stuart's claims as
habeas claims because Idaho Code Section 19-4202 does not invest district courts with
jurisdiction to consider petitions for writ of habeas corpus. Because Section 19-4202 has no
application in the instant matter, Respondent's argument fails.
Section 19-4202 is part of the Idaho Habeas Corpus and Institutional Litigation
Procedures Act ("Act"). I.C. @19-4201 - 19-4226. That Act expressly excludes from its scope
the precise kind of claims Mr. Stuart asserts, viz, those brought via a petition of habeas corpus

"as a substitute for, or in addition to, . . . . proceedings under Idaho Criminal Rule 35 or the
Uniform Post-Conviction Procedures Act, chapter 49, title 19[.]" LC. $19-4203(4). Also, the
legislature enumerated the kind of individuals who may bring claims pursuant to the Act as well
as the sorts of claims covered by the Act. Neither list covers Mr. Stuart or his claims. Finally,
the UPUPA "comprehends and takes the place of all other common law, statutory, or other

remedies heretofore available for challenging the validity of the conviction of sentence." I.C.
$19-4901(b). ConsequentIy, Respondent's reliance on Idaho Code Section 19-4202 is misplaced
and its argument that this Court is without jurisdiction to consider Mr. Stuart's claims for a writ
of habeas corpus fails.
Of course, the Section 19-4901(b) language quoted in the last paragraph suggests that Mr.
Stuart's claims for a writ of habeas corpus may be permitted only as claims for UPUPA relief.
This interpretation fails to capture the important difference between writs of habeas corpus
petitions and UPUPA relief. Whereas writs of habeas corpus are constitutionally guaranteed
(Idaho Const., art. 1, $5), the UPUPA petition is a statutory creature. I.C. @19-4901 & 2719.
Consequently, Section 19-4901(b)'s provision that the UPUPA takes the place of all other
previously available mechanisms for challenging the validity of convictions and sentences is
valid only to the extent that the UPUPA does not in any way suspend the writ of habeas corpus.
Statutes which do not conform to constitutional requirements are invalid. Idaho Schools For

Equal Educational Opportunity v. Evans, 123 Idaho 573,583,850 P.2d 724,734, reh'g denied
(1993)(allowing other branches of government "to interpret the constitution for us . . . would be

an abject abdication of our role in the American system of government"). Therefore, to the
extent that the UPUPA does suspend the writ of habeas corpus, it is constitutionally deficient and
may not be enforced. Id.
The Idaho Constitution, Article I, Section 5, provides:
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless in case
of rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires it, and then only in such manner
as shall be prescribed by law.
The privilege to the writ of habeas corpus is guaranteed without any provision for possible

waiver by potential claimants. Idaho Code Section 19-2719's waiver provisions, therefore, have
no application to habeas claims.
For these reasons, if this Court does not reach Mr. Stuart's claims for UPUPA relief, it
must reach them for writ of habeas corpus relief.

IV.

IDAHO COURTS SHOULD REACH THE MERITS OF MR. STUART'S
CLAIMS.
A.

Idaho Courts Should Reach The Merits Of Mr. Stuart's Ineffective
Assistance Of Counsel Claims Because Mr. Stuart Was Represented By The
Same Lawyer From Trial, On Direct Appeal, Through His First PostConviction Petition And Appeal, And On His Second Post-Conviction
Petition And Appeals Until 1995.

This Court has strictly construed Section 19-2719 to provide a defendant a single
"opportunity to raise all challenges to the conviction and sentence in a petition for postconviction
relief except in those unusual cases where it can be demonstrated that the issues raised were not
known and reasonably could not have been known within the time frame allowed by the statute."

State v. Rhoades, 820 P.2d 665,677 (1991). In keeping with this constitution, the Court has also
held that ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims do not fall within the unusual cases
exception because they "should reasonably be known immediately upon the completion of trial.

E.g., Fetterly v. State, 121 Idaho 417,419,825 P.2d 1073, 1075 (Idahol991), cert. denied, 506
U.S. 1002 (1992) (citations omitted)." Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469,903 P.2d 58,61 (Idaho
1995). See, also, Paz v. state, 123 Idaho 758,852 P.2d 1355, 1356-57 (Idaho1993). Indeed, the
Court has held that Section 19-2719's "unusual cases" exception does not include a successive
petition raising ineffective assistance of counsel claims even where trial counsel represented the
defendant in his initial postconviction proceedings. McGivney v. State, 133 Idaho 695,701,992

P.2d 144, 150 (Idaho1999). Consistent with the logic, the McGivney court held that even if
counsel in petitioner's first postconviction proceedings was ineffective, Section 19-2719 would
not allow that to excuse his failure to raise issues that should reasonably have been known" at the
time of the first petition. Id. at 704, 153 (citing to LC. $19-2719(5)).
Since McGivney, the Court has addressed waiver of ineffective assistance of counsel
claims brought in successive petitions in five cases. Row v. State, 135 Idaho 573, 21 P.3d 895,

reh'g denied (Idaho 2001); Rhoades v. State, 135 Idaho 299, 17 P.3d 243, reh 'g denied (Idaho
2001); Fields v. State, 135 Idaho 286, 17 P.3d 230, reh 'g denied (Idaho 2001); Pizzuto v. State,
134 Idaho 793, 10 P.3d 742, reh 'g denied (Idaho 2000); Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641, 8 P.3d
636, reh 'g denied (Idaho 2000). In none of these cases did the court modify even slightly its
earlier holding that-except for the extraordinary case "where prior counsel failed to file any
petition for post-conviction relief," McGivney at 701, 150 (citing to Dunlap v. State, 131 Idaho
576,577,961 P.2d 1179, 1190 (Idahol998)),-ineffective assistance of counsel claims are waived
by failure to raise them within forty-two days of the entry of the judgment imposing a death
sentence. Paz; Pizzuto; Fetterly; Dunlop; McGivney.
The court below ruled that Mr. Stuart did not timely assert his ineffective assistance of
trial counsel and appellate counsel claims. Mr. Stuart concedes that under Idaho law as described
in the last several paragraphs, those claims were not timely filed. However, he contends that
Idaho law as it relates to Section 19-2719 prevents postconviction petitioners "from timely
raising [I ineffective assistance of counsel claims." Hoffman v. Arave, 236 F.3d 523, 535-36
(2001). Specifically, Section 19-2719 prevents the timely assertion of ineffective assistance of
counsel claims where the petitioner "continued to be represented by his original trial counsel

during the forty-two day period." Hoffman at 534. As the Ninth Circuit observed, this court has
squarely held that ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims are subject to the forty-two day
filing requirement, and the fact that original trial counsel continues to represent death sentenced
prisoners during that forty-two day window does not bring the claims within the exception to the
forty-two day filing requirement. Id at 533. Where trial counsel continues to represent the
petitioner during post-conviction proceedings, the petitioner is
deprived of counsel who could review the record objectively for
ineffective assistance of counsel claims. . . .The ~racticalrealitv
recognized by other states that employ the unitary post-conviction
and appellate procedures-and, ultimately, recognized by the state
of Idaho itself-is that "[ilt is the rare attorney who can be expected
to contend on appeal that his representation was so poor that he
deprived his client of a fair trial." Cihak [v. United States], 59 f.3d
[296,] 303 [(2ndCir. 1995)l.

....

[Rlaising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires that
new counsel have the opportunity to conduct an investigation
beyond the court records to uncover possible omissions made by
trial counsel in the investigation and presentation of the case. See,
e.g., Osborn v. Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612,623 (lothcir. 1988)
("[I]neffectiveness claims are ordinarily inappropriate to raise on
direct appeal because they...cannot be made on the basis of the
record[.]"); Cruz v. Warden, 907 F.2d 665, 670 (7thcir. 1990) ("An
ineffective assistance claim alleging that counsel failed to prepare
involves facts outside the trial record and presents a situation in
which the Illinois courts will not invoke the res judicata or waiver
doctrines.").
Hoffman's ...allegations of ineffectiveness at trial, sentencing, and
on appeal... required investigation outside of the record at trial.
For the reasons outlined above, 919-2719 effectively prevented
Hoffman from timely raising his ineffective assistance of counsel
claims.

Hoffman at 534-36.
Mr. Stuart stands in Mr. Hoffman's shoes: Mr. Stuart was represented at trial, on direct

appeal, and in postconviction proceedings until 1995-over a decade after Idaho's forty-two day
filing requirement was enacted-by a single attorney, Mr. Robert Kinney.' Like Mr. Hoffman's
claims, Mr. Stuart's ineffective assistance of counsel claims required investigation outside the
trial record. Likewise, it required independent counsel to review the trial proceedings record for
potential ineffective assistance of direct appeal counsel claims. Consequently, just as it did in
Mr. Hoffman's case, Idaho Code Section 19-2719 "effectively prevented [Mr. Stuart] from
timely raising his ineffective assistance of counsel claims." Id.
By depriving Mr. Stuart of a full and fair opportunity to press his ineffective assistance of
counsel claims, Idaho Code Section 19-2719 and associated law violates his state and federal
right to due process. Consequently, Section 19-2719 must be struck, at least as applied to
preclude this Court's considering Mr. Stuart's ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
The court below did not address Mr. Stuart's ineffective assistance of postconviction
counsel claims. He incorporates the above arguments for why the court should reach the merits
of these claims. And he notes that he has raised those claims within a wholly reasonable time
after identifying them. Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794,992 P.2d 789,793 (Ct.App. 1999)
("'ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel, if true, provides sufficient reason for
permitting newly asserted allegations to be raised in a subsequent post-conviction application.
[Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 5911 at 596,635 P.2d [955, at] 960 [(1981)].").
This Court should remand the case for an evidentiary hearing on Mr. Stuart's ineffective

'Idaho law clearly provides that even though a petitioner's judgment of conviction and
sentence of death was entered by the district court before Idaho Code Section 19-2719 was
enacted, that provision nevertheless applies. See, e.g., Esquivel v. State, 128 Idaho 390,913 P.2d
1160, reh 'g denied (Idaho1996).

assistance of trial and appellate counsel claims.

B.

Idaho Courts Should Reach the Merits of the Prosecutorial Misconduct
Claims.

Mr. Stuart asserts four instances of prosecutorial misconduct: the prosecution (1) advised
at least one witness not to testify that Mr. Stuart suffered from mental health difficulties; (2)
knew that at the preliminary hearing, state witnesses ingested small tab pills which purportedly
had a calming effect, (3) encouraged its prior bad acts witnesses to exchange their anticipated
testimony by (a) housing them in the same small hotel for the preliminary hearing, (b) housing
them in the same small hotel for the trial, and (c) bringing them into a single room before the
preliminary hearing while failing to advise them not to exchange their anticipated testimony
and/or by failing to take adequate steps to ensure that they did not exchange such testimony, and

(4) encouraged its prior bad acts witnesses to exaggerate Mr. Stuart's misdeeds by providing a
heightened sense of danger by (a) placing police officers at the hotel during the preliminary
hearing and trial, (b) relating to at least one prior bad acts witness that the prosecution had
received calls &om community members threatening Mr. Stuart, (c) compelling Mr. Stuart to
wear leg irons at his preliminary hearing, and (d) using heightened security measures at trial
including placing uniformed and armed police officers close to Mr. Stuart and requiring security
checks of ail who entered the courtroom. The court below summarily dismissed each of Mr.
Stuart's claims of prosecutorial misconduct on the ground that he knew or should have known
each of them at the time of his direct appeal andfor at the time he filed his first petition for
postconviction relief.
The United States Supreme Court, however, has squarely rejected the position that
petitioners who fail to discover facts supporting claims in a timely manner waive those claims,
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even when the failure is due to prosecutorial misdeeds. Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004).

The State here nevertheless urges, in effect, that the prosecution
can lie and conceal and the prisoner still has the burden to discover
the evidence, so long as thepotential existence of a prosecutorial
misconduct claim might have been detected. . .Ordinarily, we
presume that public officials have properly discharged their official
duties. . .Court, litigants, and juries properly anticipate that
obligations to refrain from improper methods to secure a
conviction. . .plainly rest[ing] upon the prosecuting attorney, will
be faithfully observed. Prosecutors' dishonest conduct or
unwarranted concealment should attract no judicial approbation.

Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668,696 (2004) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
At the same time that it summarily dismissed the matter, the court below evaluated the
claims as if they had been fully developed in an evidentiary hearing. Mr. Stuart moved for an
evidentiary hearing, but the court below did not grant that motion.
The Court should remand this matter for consideration of the prosecutorial misconduct
claims on their merits, including an evidentiary hearing.

C.

Idaho Courts Should Reach the Merits of the Claim That the Prosecution
Withheld from the Trial Court and the Defense Critical Mitigating
Information While Simultaneously Arguing That No Such Information
Existed.

Mr. Stuart claimed that the prosecution obtained but withheld from the defense critical
mitigating information, including the following information from interviews of potential
witnesses conducted shortly after his arrest. Mr. Stuart was raised in a home characterized by
physical violence between his parents. See Petition For Postconviction Relief and Petition for

Writ ofHabeas Corpus ("Petition") at Appendix B at 3-4 (Elaine Haugen interview). Mr. Stuart
was the target of his parents' sexual abuse. See Petition at Appendix A at I. He was aware from

a young age that his father was raping his sisters, and he was profoundly troubled by his father's
misconduct. See Petition Appendix C at 2,33-35. Even Mr. Stuart's young wife was the target
of the elder Mr. Stuart's sexual misconduct. See Petition at Appendix C at 35. Mr. Stuart was
the target of his father's physical abuse as well. See Petition at Appendix D at 1 (Sandra Stuart
Interview), Appendix E at 1 (Susan Stuart Interview), and Appendix F at 1 (Memorandum
regarding Susan Stuart Interview). It may well be that in addition to these horrifically
destructive environmental influences, Mr. Stuart was predisposed to mental health difficulties,
for his son was receiving psychiatric care and medication as an adolescent. See Petition at
Appendix C at 40. Despite this horror and despite the fact that Ms. Toavs and Mr. Stuart wed in
their senior year after learning that she was expecting, Mr. Stuart managed to graduate high
school and, a short time later, enter an automotive mechanics school. See Petition at Appendix C
at 2. Not surprisingly, however, over time Mr. Stuart began to self-medicate. See Petition at
Appendix B at 7, Appendix G at 10 (Brandy Shale Interview), and Appendix H at 9 (Vickie
Batey Interview).
The court below ruled that because "[tlhe person with the best knowledge, insight and
understanding of Stuart's childhood is Stuart and persons known to Stuart," the prosecution "did
not hide, nor could he hide" the information. C.R. at 655 (Memorandum Opinion at 19). This
ruling assumes that Mr. Stuart, having suffered in rich detail the experiences barely described
above, was emotionally and mentally able to share what he knew. It is by now commonly known
that victims of sexual and physical abuse often are unable to share their experiences with others.
Trauma only start at the moment of abuse. Whether it ever ends is an open question. Yet the
court below assumed, without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing, that Mr. Stuart was able to

share with his lawyer-a lawyer who did no mitigation investigation whatsoever-the information
which even the court below characterizes as describing "Mr. Stuart's childhood as replete with
serious physical abuse inflicted by Stuart's father upon Stuart, his siblings, and his mother....[and
which] describe a childhood in which Stuart was exposed to his father's incestuous sexual abuse
of Stuart's sisters." C.R. at 654-55 (Memorandum Opinion at 18-19).
The Court should remand the case for an evidentiary hearing on these claims.

CONCLUSION
For all these reasons considered individually and severally, this Court should reverse the
lower court's summary dismissal. The Court should remand this matter for an evidentiary
hearing on the merits of each claim raised.
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